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Abstract. Current intrusion detection systems go beyond the detec-
tion of attacks and provide reaction mechanisms to cope with detected
attacks or at least reduce their effect. Previous research works have pro-
posed methods to automatically select possible countermeasures capable
of ending the detected attack. But actually, countermeasures have side
effects and can be as harmful as the detected attack. In this paper, we
propose to improve the reaction selection process by giving means to
quantify the effectiveness and select the countermeasure that has the
minimum negative side effect on the information system. To achieve this
goal, we adopt a risk assessment and analysis approach.
Keywords: Intrusion detection system, attack scenario, countermea-
sure, risk analysis, potentiality, impact.
1 Introduction
In intrusion detection approach [1], several security monitoring modules exist.
A module gathers and correlates the generated alerts to recognize the current
attack and ask the administrator to take action to prevent the damage of the
attacks[2]. After all, in the intrusion detection approach, it is almost useless to
recognize the attack without having the means to stop it.
There are two different approaches for the reaction perspective: Hot reaction
and policy based reaction. The first aims to launch a local action on the target
machine to end a process, or on target network component to block a traffic, that
are the cause of the launched alerts. For example Kill process, Reset connection,
Quarantine can be used to react against an attack. The second acts on more
general scope; it considers not only the threats reported in the alerts, but also
constraints and objectives of the organization operating the information system
and this by modifying the access policy. Therefore a trade-off can be established
between security objectives, operation objectives and constraints.
Whatever the adopted approach, each countermeasure can have negative or
positive side effects. The same countermeasure that was activated to end an
attack can make the information system more vulnerable, expose it to other
attacks, or even have an impact more disastrous than the attack itself. For ex-
ample Firewall reconfiguration is effective against a DOS attack, but can be very
harmful if valuable connections will be lost, therefore many questions emerge: Is
it better to stand still? Or is the attack harmful enough to react? In this case,
which countermeasure must be selected with minimum negative side effects?
To answer these questions, we adopt a risk analysis approach. Risk analysis
is a known method to analyze and evaluate the risks that threaten organization
assets. The fist step of a risk analysis method is to collect data that describes the
system state; the second step is analyze them and find the potential threats and
their severity; and the final step is to study the countermeasure effectiveness to
eliminate these threats or reduce their severity. The existing methods are used
to manage system assets and evaluate the risk that threatens these assets: they
are unfortunately abstract, informal and not fully compatible with intrusion
detection and computer systems. In section 2, related works are presented. The
model is presented in section 3, and an implementation is showed in section 4.
Finally section 5 concludes this paper.
2 Related Works
In intrusion detection approach, the final objective is to detect intrusions and
then block them to prevent the attacker to achieve his or her objective. First,
to detect and recognize the current attack, an alerts correlation procedure is
needed. The correlation procedure recognizes relationships between alerts in or-
der to associate these alerts into a more global intrusion scenario, and the intru-
sion objectives that violates the predefined organization security policies. There
are many approaches that can be used for this purpose: implicit [4], explicit [5,
6] and semi-explicit [7, 8] correlations. The semi-explicit approach is based on
the description of the elementary intrusions corresponding to the alerts. This
approach then finds causal relationships between these elementary alerts and
connects these elementary alerts when such a relationship exists. The correla-
tion procedure then consists in building a scenario that corresponds to an attack
graph of steps corresponding to the elementary intrusions. This approach is more
generic and flexible because only the elementary steps are defined as entities and
not the whole attacks scenarii. Regarding reaction, it is also the most interest-
ing because it provides a precise diagnosis of the ongoing intrusion scenario.
Using an approach similar to the one used to describe elementary intrusions,
elementary countermeasures can be specified. In this case, anti-correlation [9]
can be used to find the countermeasures capable of ending a detected scenario.
Anti-correlation approach is based upon finding the appropriate countermeasure
that turn an elementary future step of an attack inexecutable due to precondi-
tions value modifications. Therefore, using anti-correlation approach, the admin-
istrator knows which countermeasures from a predefined library those who are
capable of blocking the threat.
There are two types of reaction: Hot Reactions and Policy Based Reactions
[10]. In the first case, simple countermeasures are activated to end the detected
attack. The advantage is fast reaction guaranteed by activating a simple counter-
measure; therefore the threat is instantaneously terminated. In other hand, hot
reactions do not prevent the occurrence of the attack in the future, therefore a
countermeasure is activated each time the attack occurs. Policy based reactions
consists of modifying or creating new rules in the access policy to prevent an
attack in the future, therefore it corresponds to a long term reaction.
Whatever the adopted type of reaction, a countermeasure could have neg-
ative impact on the information system. For example, in some situations, an
administrator prefers not to react because the risk of the detected attack is
smaller than the risk resulting from triggering off a candidate countermeasure.
The goal is not always to block the attack, but to minimize the risk incurred
by target information system. Therefore a risk assessment method is needed
to evaluate and quantify the risk of an attack and its countermeasures. The
method is useful to decide when it is preferable to react, and which counter-
measure should be activated. There are several Risk Assessment methods like
EBIOS [11, 12], MARION [13], MEHARI [14], etc. These methods are used to
manage system assets and evaluate the risk that threatens these assets; they
are unfortunately abstract, informal and incompatible with intrusion detection
and computer systems: Many elements and parameters are related to physical
and nature disasters (fire, earthquake, failure, etc.). Besides, their are many es-
sentials factors that exists in intrusion detection systems and even in computer
systems (networks, firewall, software, etc.) that does not exist in these meth-
ods. There are also elements that need redefinition to be compatible with the
intrusion systems like potentiality and impact of a threat.
3 Risk Assessment Model
MEHARI method is the latest, more accurate and flexible risk analysis method,
and that is why we decided to adapt this method to detection intrusion systems.
Therefore, we propose a new risk analysis method compatible with intrusion
detection systems inspired from MEHARI, by adapting, redefining and adding
new parameters and functions.
The risk is defined as a potential exploitation of an existing vulnerability; this
exploitation has an impact on the affected assets. Therefore, the gravity of risk
Grav of an attack scenario is the combination of two major factors: Potentiality
Pot and Impact Imp. Each of the major factors depends on minor factors. In
turn, these minor factors are evaluated using audit clusters. In MEHARI method,
an audit cluster is a group of general questions to determine the general system
state. In our approach, an audit cluster contains multiple coherent questions or
tests, therefore the value of an audit cluster is the arithmetic mean value of all
the questions-tests. These questions-tests aim to evaluate a specific service state
(antivirus, firewall, vulnerabilities, etc.) in real time when an attack occurs.
In our method, we choose to evaluate the risk gravity, the major and minor
factors and the audit clusters with a scale that ranges from 0 to 4. The value 0 is
used when the studied element does not exist, and the value 4 in the maximum
Fig. 1. Risk Assessment structure
value that an element can have. This scale is sufficient to evaluate these factors,
and a larger scale would be more confusing for the system administrators.
The structure of the model is shown in Fig.1. The total risk Total Grav is
the combination of the candidate scenarii risk gravities. In the following sections
we detail each of the risk gravity’s factors.
3.1 Potentiality Pot
The major factor Potentiality Pot measures the probability of a given scenario
to take place and achieve its objective with success. To evaluate Pot, we must
first evaluate its minor factors: natural exposition Expo and dissuasive measures
Diss and we have to take into account classification of the attack also. The
minor factors can be evaluated after the appropriate audit clusters are calculated.
These questions-tests aim to evaluate the system state (active services, existent
vulnerabilities, etc.). As we aforementioned, all these elements can have values
between 0 and 4. The value 0 indicates that the studied scenario is impossible,
and the value 4 indicates that the occurrence and the successful execution of the
scenario are inevitable.
Natural Exposure Expo This minor factor measures the natural exposure
of the target system faced to the detected attack, and by adopting a defensive
centric view. It reflects the system state contribution (established connections,
acquired privileges, existing vulnerabilities, time, previous incidents, etc.). We
propose the following audit clusters that contribute in the evaluation of Expo:
– LAMBDA Prediction: This is the most important cluster for the Expo
evaluation. It estimates the probablility of occurrences of the studied sce-
nario. This is possibly done by the analysis of the predicates and the facts
that describes the pre and post conditions of an elementary attack step.
LAMBDA language [15] is an example to describe these elementary steps by
defining the pre and post conditions. The value of this cluster increases each
time the attacker gets closer to his or her intrusion objective. This cluster is
estimated in real time.
– History: This cluster indicates the number of scenario incidents achieved
with success in the past. If History increases, EXPO increases as well. This
cluster is most useful in the situation where an elementary step in the attacks
graph is common to two or more scenarii. This cluster is very similar to the
concept of Natural Exposure in MEHARI method, and it is estimated oﬄine.
– Global T ime: Some attacks occur in special hours or dates (at night, week-
ends or holidays), and the same behavior could be normal during a time,
but it is an evidence of an attack during another time. For example, a high
level of network traffic is normal during the day, but suspicious during the
night. If the scenario is independent of time, this cluster will have the mid
scale value (thus 2).
Using these audit clusters, Expo can now be calculated:
EXPO =
α ∗ LAMBDA Predict+ β ∗History + γ ∗Global T ime
α+ β + γ
(1)
where α, β and γ are three coefficients that depend on the system.
Dissuasive MeasuresDiss To reduce the probability of an attacker to progress
with his or her attack (and thus to decrease the potentiality Pot), dissuasive
measures Diss can be enforced. They aim particularly to reduce the attackers’
aggression. There are useful against human attackers, not automated attacks or
accidents. If Diss increases, Pot normally will decrease because Diss makes the
attacks riskier and more difficult. We propose three clusters to evaluate these
measures:
– Logging: This cluster joins all the questions-tests that check the installation
and the state of all logging mechanisms. This cluster is evaluated in real time
to verify that the attack actions are logged.
– Send Warning: This cluster indicates if it is possible to send warning to an
attacker (knowing his or her IP, his or her username, etc.). In fact, warnings
play a significant role to reduce scenarios Pot because the attackers knows
that he or she was caught red handed and it is risky to let the attack goes
on. This cluster is evaluated in real time.
– Laws: This cluster checks if the current attack can be considered a violation
of the local, national or international laws. The fact that a law forbids a
particular attack reduces its probability because it is risky for the attacker.
This cluster is evaluated oﬄine and in real time, because we should first
verify the laws in the attackers country and the target country as well.
The minor factor Diss can now be calculated, using the three audit clusters
presented above. These clusters have the same weight effect on the attacker
aggression level:
DISS =
LOGGING+ SEND WARNING+ LAWS
3
(2)
Evaluation of Potentiality Pot After we had estimated Expo and Diss,we
can now estimate the major factor Pot. However, the attacks scenarii are too far
to have the same proprieties regarding their potentiality. Therefore, we will pro-
pose a classification, and associate each class with a specific function to calculate
Pot. This classification provides means to evaluate POT more accurately and
realistically. Many taxonomies were proposed in [16, 17]. In our approach, we will
consider two classes: Malicious Actions and Accidents. These two classes allow
us to consider if the human factor is involved, and therefore the effectiveness of
Diss.
For Malicious Actions, having Expo and Diss, we propose to use a predefined
2D matrix to calculate Pot. For Accidents and Non-Malicious Actions, Diss is
useless and therefore:
Pot = Expo (3)
3.2 Impact Imp
The second major factor to evaluate Risk Gravity of an attack scenario is Im-
pact Imp.
−−→
Imp is defined as a vector with three cells that correspond to the
three fundamental security principles: Availability Avail, Confidentiality Conf
and Integrity Integ. Therefore, with each Intrusion Objective, a vector
−−→
Imp is
associated and should be evaluated. Actually, it is not possible to statically eval-
uate
−−→
Imp of a scenario (or more precisely the
−−→
Imp of the scenario’s intrusion
objective) directly because it depends on several dynamic elements. The impact
depends on the importance of the target assets
−−−→
Class, and the impact reduc-
tion measures level
−→
IR that are deployed on the system to reduce and limit the
impact once the attack was successful.
Assets Classification Class For each attack, the attacker seeks to achieve it
by successfully executing the last node in the scenario graph: The final intrusion
objective that violates the system security policy. Each intrusion objective is of
course associated with a sensitive asset. However, the assets have different lev-
els of classification that depend on their importance for system functionalities
and survivability. Therefore, for each asset, we will associate the vector
−−−→
Class
with 3 cells that represent three types of classification relative to the three cells
of
−−→
Imp (Avail, Conf and Integ).
−−−→
Class will be the sum of two components:−−−−−−−−−→
Static Class that is evaluated oﬄine and reflects the intrinsic value of the as-
set, and
−−−−−−−−−−−→
Dynamic Class that can be evaluated online using the following audit
clusters:
– Global T ime: The assets value can depend on time. For instance, confiden-
tiality level of information decreases over the time, or the availability of a
server is less required during holidays, etc.
– Conn Nbr: Connection number is most useful to calculate Dynamic Class
that increases if the number of connections increases.
Impact Reduction IR To face attacks, many measures are used to reduce
their impact. Vector
−→
IR aims to evaluate the measures levels that reduce the
impact relative to Avail, Conf and Integ. Therefore vector
−→
IR contains three
cells: IRAvail, IRConf and IRInteg. There are three sets of measures: Protective
Measures PRO to reduce direct consequences, Palliative Measures Pall to re-
duce indirect consequences and Recuperative Measures Recup to reduce the final
losses. Once Pro, Pall and Recup are calculated, we can evaluate the three cells
of
−→
IR. For each cell, we define a 3D matrix to calculate the component IRx in
function of the three types of measures. In the following sections, we present the
three sets of impact reduction measures and then how to calculate them using
a specific taxonomy:
Protective Measures Pro: The Protective Measures or Pro aim, once the attack
was executed successfully, to limit and contain direct negative consequences.
Therefore, the goal of Pro is not to prevent the attack itself, but to confine the
attack damage and prevent its propagation and therefore the infection of other
assets of the system. For instance, a firewall prevents worms from propagating
through the network. Thus, Pro is a major factor to reduce the impact of an
intrusion. To evaluate Pro, we propose the use of the following audit clusters:
– Antivirus: The role of this cluster is to check if an antivirus is installed. It
also checks if its signature base is up to date.
– Antispyware: Similar to the previous Cluster, it checks the antispyware
deployed in the system.
– Quarantine: This cluster checks if quarantine mechanisms are installed and
if they are effective against the detected scenario.
– Firewall: This cluster checks if filtering components, like firewalls, are in-
stalled and the effectiveness of their configuration against the detected at-
tack.
– Global T ime: The systems level of protection depends on time. For instance,
many machines are turned off during night and therefore they are protected.
It checks the system clock to verify if the target assets are more vulnerable
or exposed in the attack occurrence time.
– Admin Avail: Actually, the attacks can occur anytime and anywhere. This
cluster aims to determine if the administrator is available when the attack
is detected. In other hand, the administrator works in specific period and
he or she is not always present when an attack occurs. Therefore, when the
administrator is absent, Prot and the three cells of
−→




Palliative Measures Pall: Palliative Measures Pall verify the system capabil-
ity of reducing indirect consequences of attacks. In other words, Pall is used
to maintain the system functionalities running as normally as possible. These
measures are essential to reduce the impact and the risk gravity of the detected
attacks. To evaluate Pall, we propose the following audit clusters:
– Backup Ready: This cluster checks if the target assets (especially if they
were victim of an attack that violates their integrity or availability) have
ready-to-use backups (or already in use as it is the case for load distri-
bution).These backups reduce significantly the impact of an attack on the
system. For example, the impact of a DOS attack on a given server has low
impact if an existing backup server is ready to be used.
– Admin Avail: If the administrators, who are capable to properly react and
limit the indirect consequences and to assure the good operation of the sys-
tem, are not available, Pall will dramatically decreases and the impact of
the attack increases.
Recuperative Measures Recup: After every attack, the system will suffer from
losses: confidentiality, integrity or availability of hardware or software assets
that can ultimately leads to financial losses. To reduce these kind of losses,
Recuperative Measures Recup can be used. The recuperation process is generally
complex, but it reduces the final losses of the system and the company who owns
that system. To evaluate Recup, we propose the following audit clusters:
– Backup Exist: This cluster checks if the target assets have backups. In gen-
eral, these backups are not ready-to-use (oﬄine backups), and a specific
procedure is required to put them into service. In spite of that, they are
much useful to reduce final losses, for instance: Stored hard disks containing
redundant data, or a router waiting to be configured and activated.
– Third Party: In some special cases, we cannot limit the losses, but it is
possible to subscribe to a third party like an assurance company that takes
charge of these losses. Thus, the final losses and the impact of an attack are
reduced. Therefore, this cluster verifies if the target assets are assured, or if
the cost and the losses are partially or totally undertaken by a third party.
Evaluation of Pro, Pall and Recup: As we explained, the impact gravity de-
pends on the attack’s intrusion objective. These objectives are not similar: An
impact reduction measure that can be effective against an objective A can be
useless against another objective B. Therefore we need ”attack centric” taxon-
omy to classify these objectives and associate each class with the functions to
calculate Pro, Pall and Recup using their audit clusters. We propose to define
five categories: (1) User to Root, (2) Remote to Local, (3) Denial of Service, (4)
Probe and (5) System Access.













Imp is a vector with three components:
ImpAvail, ImpConf and ImpInteg. To calculate the component Impx, we can
use a predefined 2D matrix to combine IRx and Classx. The IRx has the effect
to reduce Impx whereas Classx has the opposing effect. After that the three
components of
−−→
Imp are calculated, we keep the component that has the highest
value therefore:
Imp = max(Impx) ; x ∈ {Avail, Conf, Integ} (4)
3.3 Risk Gravity of an Attack Scenario Grav
For each detected attack, the risk gravity must be evaluated to estimate the dan-
ger level of this attack. The risk is the combination of Potentiality and Impact.
An attack that occurs frequently with little impact may have the same risk level
as another rare attack that have significant impact. In our approach, we use a
2D matrix to calculate the scenario’s gravity of risk. If a scenario has Pot or Imp
equal to zero, the scenario’s gravity risk Grav will be null. Grav of a scenario u
can be calculated using the function f defined as a 2D matrix:
Gravu = f(Potu; Impu) (5)




0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 2 3
2 0 0 1 3 4
3 0 1 2 3 4
4 0 2 3 4 4
If a scenario u has Impu = 3 but Potu = 1 , therefore Gravu will be lower
(= 2) than Impu considering the fact that scenario u has a low potentiality.
3.4 Total Risk Gravity Total Grav
In most situations, the correlation and reaction module do not deal with one
specific scenario. Instead, the module have to take into account many candidate
and even simultaneous scenarios. Therefore, before estimating the total gravity of
risk, we must evaluate the gravity of risk of each scenario separately as mentioned
in the sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. Then we define the Total gravity as an ordered
vector containing the values of gravity risk of each candidate scenario (See Fig.2).
An order relation can be defined between the different instances of
−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav
using the lexicographic comparison. Therefore we are able to judge which graph
has the highest risk gravity.
Fig. 2. Construction of
−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav
3.5 Reaction and Countermeasure Selection
The correlation and reaction modules suggest for each detected attack a set of
countermeasures using anti-correlation [9] approach. This set is called
Anticorrelation CM . These countermeasures are capable of stopping the de-
tected attack. In other hand, the reaction is based on the assessment of the
countermeasure negative and/or positive side effects on the information system.
These side effects can be evaluated using the previously introduced method.
Therefore, to judge if a countermeasure u is acceptable, a comparison must be
done between:
– Situation ”Before” : This is the state of the Information system before the
execution of a countermeasure u. The correspondent risk is
−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav
– Situation ”After” : This is the state of the Information system after the sim-
ulated execution of a countermeasure u. The correspondent risk is−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav CMu that depends on two elements: (1) countermeasure intrin-




Countermeasure Intrinsic Impact and Risk Gravity A countermeasure
can have negative impact on the information system due to its intrinsic im-
pact. We propose to associate with the countermeasure description a field called
Impact. This field is an integer between 0 and 4. To calculate the Risk Grav-
ity GCMu of the countermeasure u, the function f is used, the Pot parameter
value is 4 because the execution of the studied countermeasure is guaranteed
once it was selected, and the Imp parameter value is the one that exists in the
countermeasure description.
GCMu = f(Pot = 4, Imp = CM.Impact) (6)
System Information Risk Gravity after Reaction A countermeasure u
modifies Pot or Imp. Therefore, we must evaluate the new
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u after
the selection of the countermeasure u. The same method is used to calculate−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u as
−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav, but using the new graph attack and the information
system state after the simulated execution of the countermeasure u. The new
graph attack is due to the modification caused by the simulated countermeasure
execution in the relations found by the correlation module.
Countermeasure Selection Procedure Once for each countermeasure u,
GCMu and
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u are evaluated,
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav CMu can be evaluated :
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav CMu =
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u ∪GCMu (7)
Now, only the countermeasures from Anticorrelated CM that decrease the
total gravity risk are kept and a new set Risk Eff CM is defined that contains
only risk efficient countermeasures:
∀CMu ∈ Anticorrelated CM ;−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Total Grav CMu ≤ −−−−−−−−→Total Grav (8)
⇒ CMu ∈ Risk Eff CM
Fig. 3. Anticorrelated CM and Risk Eff CM sets
Now, the procedure used to judge if a reaction is necessary and which coun-
termeasure to select is the following:
If ((CMu ∈ Risk Eff CM) and





To verify the utility and the effectiveness of our model, we seek in this section
to evaluate the risk of the Mitnick attack and the candidate countermeasure to
judge if the countermeasure is effective. The Mitnick attack graph generated by
CRIM [18] using the LAMBDA language [15] is composed of four elementary
steps (See Fig.4). We suppose that the attacker was capable to execute success-
fully the first three steps. Therefore one final step remains before the attacker
achieves his or her intrusion objective Illegal Remote Shell on a critical machine,
and we suppose the correspondent Impact is maximum (= 4).
Fig. 4. Mitnikc Attack graph generated by CRIM using LAMBDA language
Before Reaction The Attack spoofed remote shell precondition is true. The
attacker is very close to his or her Intrusion objective and LAMBDA Pred =
4⇒ Pot = 4. Therefore GRAVMITNICK = f(Pot = 4, Imp = 4) = 4. Mit-
nick is the only candidate scenario, so
−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav = 4
After Reaction Simulation The Attack spoofed remote shell precondition
becomes false, so LAMBDA Pred decreases and Pot = 1.
ThereforeGRAV ′mitnick = f(Pot = 1 , Imp = 4) = 3⇒
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′block conn =
3. We suppose that Gblock conn = 1⇒ −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→Total Grav block conn = 3, 1.
It is clear that
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav block conn <
−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav, therefore the counter-
measure block conn can be selected.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, a risk assessment model is presented to improve the reaction in
the detection intrusion system. This model is used to assess and quantify the
risk of attacks and countermeasures. Therefore, a clear procedure can be used
to judge if a reaction is necessary, and which countermeasure must be chosen.
Using the risk analysis approach, the reaction against an attack is more efficient,
and harmful countermeasures may be avoided. There are several perspectives
to this work: First, the audit clusters are so far considered as inputs; we will
propose the evaluation method of each cluster. Second, the functions used can
be more precise by using advanced ponderable mean functions, and use more
sophisticated taxonomies.
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